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BALANCING BURDENS FOR ACCUSED INFRINGERS:
HOW IN RE SEAGATE GOT IT RIGHT
INTRODUCTION
Imagine an inventor trying to design a cheaper, faster, smaller, and
more reliable microprocessor. If successful, he could revolutionize the
computing industry. But to be successful, he must build upon current
technology that is protected by thousands of patents. In order to
avoid willful infringement, he needs to know the scope and validity of
each of those prior patents. Acquiring an opinion on every prior pat-
ent would be prohibitively costly.' Faced with these costs, it is likely
that the inventor would simply steer clear of the whole mess and
thereby deprive the public of the potential benefit of his ideas. For
years inventors had to seek out patents that might be infringed by
their actions and obtain non-infringement opinions before taking any
steps that might possibly infringe. The Federal Circuit mitigated this
burden in In re Seagate Technologies LLC, which, among other things,
eliminated the affirmative duty of potential infringers to obtain opin-
ions of counsel in order to avoid willful infringement.2
Before Seagate, courts applied three general rules related to awards
of enhanced damages in patent infringement cases. First, the infringer
must have acted willfully. Second, accused infringers have an affirma-
tive duty of due care, including a duty to obtain advice of competent
counsel such as a non-infringement opinion letter, upon actual notice
of a patentee's rights. Third, when presenting the opinion letter as a
defense to willful infringement, defendants waive the attorney-client
privilege for all communications and work product relating to the sub-
ject matter of the opinion.3 In the past few decades courts have read
the willfulness, affirmative duty, and broad waiver rules into the dam-
ages statute4 and more consistently referred to these rules when
awarding enhanced damages. 5 Yet, it is unclear whether such judi-
1. See Edwin H. Taylor & Glenn E. Von Tersch, A Proposal to Shore Up the Foundations of
Patent Law That the Underwater Line Eroded, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 721. 740 (1998)
("A reliable patent opinion costs at least $10,000 if the patent has any real complexity.").
2. In re Seagate Tech. LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
3. Because the subject matter of the opinion is typically infringement and the core issue in the
case is infringement, the waiver would usually include everything in the case from the infringe-
ment opinion to trial strategies.
4. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
5. See infra notes 18-91 and accompanying text.
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cially introduced rules are consistent with the letter and intent of pat-
ent legislation. The Federal Circuit's recent Seagate decision and
currently proposed legislation show that these judicially created rules
are quickly eroding.
Part II of this Note presents the history of these judicially crafted
requirements. It presents both a legislative 6 and judicial7 history of
the willfulness requirement, introduces the affirmative duty of due
care as set forth in Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen
Co.,8 and discusses the broad subject matter waiver found in In re
EchoStar Communications Corp.9 Part III discusses the Seagate deci-
sion and presents the new standards outlined by the court.10 Part IV
analyzes the judicially created requirements for enhanced damages,
both individually and as an interconnected whole.11 Part V analyzes
the impact that the Seagate decision will have on patent law and prac-
tice.12 Part VI concludes by reaffirming the value of Seagate's correc-
tive changes to patent law. Specifically, Part VI contends that
eliminating the affirmative duty, narrowing the scope of the attorney-
client waiver, and maintaining the requirement of willfulness for en-
hanced damages will strengthen the patent system, benefit consumers,
and maintain efficiency within the judicial system.
II. BACKGROUND
Courts are allowed to award damages against a party up to three
times the actual amount of damages assessed.13 Section A of this Part
discusses the statutory history of enhanced damages and proposed
changes to the existing regime.14 Section B then discusses the judicial
history of enhanced damages and describes three countervailing con-
siderations for determining whether enhanced damages are appropri-
ate.' 5 First, courts have recognized an affirmative duty requiring
potential infringers who become aware of relevant patents to obtain
non-infringement opinions before acting in a possibly infringing man-
ner.1 6 Second, presenting these opinions during trial to avoid en-
6. See infra notes 18-45 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 46-91 and accompanying text.
8. 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see infra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
9. 448 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see infra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 108-144 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 145-258 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 259-268 and accompanying text.
13. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
14. See infra notes 18-45 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 46-107 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
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hanced damages removes any attorney-client protection of the
opinions and all related materials. 17 And finally, failure to obtain or
present a favorable opinion as a defense is evidence of the required
willfulness that enables courts to treble damages.
A. Statutory History of Enhanced Damages
In 1790, the first Patent Act allowed a patentee to recover damages
assessed by a jury.18 Though there was no provision for enhancing
those damages in the first patent act, 19 the Patent Act of February 21,
179320 introduced treble damages into American patent law.21 The
Act allowed a patentee to recover "a sum, that shall be at least equal
to three times the price, for which the patentee has usually sold or
licensed to other persons, the use of the said invention, '22 but the Act
did not give courts discretion in awarding treble damages. 23 Though
the Act of April 17, 1800 changed the damages to "a sum equal to
three times the actual damage sustained," courts still did not have
discretion in trebling damages.24
The early nineteenth century saw a large increase in patent activ-
ity.25 America emerged as a powerful inventive force, challenging Eu-
rope's status as the center of invention.26 The patent laws in effect at
the turn of the nineteenth century were inadequate to meet the needs
of the growing industrial nation.27 The patent system was weak.28
Fraudulent patents were frequently granted, and those patents were
used to exact improper judgments from innocent individuals.29 Addi-
tionally, meritorious inventors saw their inventions pirated, with ex-
17. See infra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
18. Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 4, 1 Stat. 109, 111.
19. Id.
20. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318, 322.
21. In re Seagate Tech. LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Gajarsa, J., concurring).
22. Id. (quoting Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318, 322).
23. Id.
24. Id. (quoting Act of Apr. 17, 1800, ch. 25, § 3, 2 Stat. 37, 38)
25. S. Select Comm. on Patents, 24th Cong., Report Accompanying S. 239 (1st Sess. 1836)
(Ruggles), reprinted in DONALD S. CHISUM, 9 CHISUM ON PATENTS app. 12, at 1 (2005).
26. Id. at 6-10.
27. Id. at 5-8.
28. Id. at 5.
29. Id. One practice is described as
taking out patents for what has been long in public use, and what every one has there-
fore a right to use. The patentee in such cases being armed with the apparent authority
of the Government, having the sanction of its highest officers the seal of state, scours
the country, and by threats of prosecution, compels those who are found using the thing
patented, to pay the patent price or commutation tribute.
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pensive lawsuits as their only option for protection. 30 To rectify these
injustices, the Patent Act of 1836 greatly expanded the Patent Of-
fice's power to review and reject applications and restored the flexibil-
ity of the treble damages remedy.3'
Finally, the Patent Act of July 4, 1836 gave courts the discretion to
award any amount up to three times the amount assessed, "according
to the circumstances of the case."' 32 Since the Patent Act of 1836,
courts have had discretion to award enhanced damages up to three
times the amount assessed.33 Congress passed the current version of
the rule in § 284 of the Patent Act of 1952, which states that "the court
may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or
assessed. '34
Although the text of § 284 has remained constant, there is growing
support for changes to the law that would codify much of the Seagate
decision.35 A bill was introduced in Congress in 2007 that would
amend § 284 to include a statutory requirement of willfulness to en-
hance damages under that section.36 The bill also explicitly states the
proposed grounds for a finding of willfulness and limitations
thereon,37 and it advances the idea that "[t]he decision of the infringer
not to present evidence of advice of counsel is not relevant to a deter-
mination of willful infringement .... "38
The proposed statute would allow a finding of willful infringement
under three circumstances, if shown by clear and convincing evi-
dence.39 First, a court could find willful infringement if, after receiv-
ing written notice from the patentee alleging specific infringement of
particular claims, and after having a reasonable opportunity to investi-
gate, an infringer continues the infringing act. 40 Second, intentional
copying with knowledge of the patent would be grounds for willful-
30. Id.
31. In re Seagate Tech. LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Gajarsa, J., concurring).
32. Id. (quoting Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 14, 5 Stat 117, 123).
33. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1954) contained the phrase, "the court may increase the damages up to
three times the amount found or assessed." Act of July 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792,
813.
34. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
35. See infra notes 105-144 and accompanying text.
36. "A court that has determined that the infringer has willfully infringed a patent ... may
increase the damages. Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 5(c)(1) (2007).
37. Id. § 5(c)(2).
38. Id. § 5(c)(3)(C). The inference was judicially eliminated in Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer
Nutzfahrzeuge Gmbh v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
39. H.R. 1908, § 5(c)(2).
40. Id. § 5(c)(2)(A).
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ness.41 Third, a court could find willful infringement if a court had
previously found similar conduct by the same party to be infringing. 42
Under the proposed statute, when an accused "had an informed
good faith belief that the patent was invalid or unenforceable, or
would not be infringed by the conduct," there would be no finding of
willfulness. 43 The statute explains:
An informed good faith belief... may be established by [1] reason-
able reliance on advice of counsel; [2] evidence that the infringer
sought to modify its conduct to avoid infringement once it had dis-
covered the patent; or [3] other evidence a court may find sufficient
to establish such good faith belief.44
The proposed legislation, if passed, would incorporate Seagate's inter-
pretation of the standard for enhanced damages into law.45
B. Judicial History of Enhanced Damages
1. Requirement of Willfulness
Since the courts were given discretion to enhance damages in 1836,
courts have awarded enhanced damages for either a remedial or puni-
tive purpose, or a combination of both.46 Although the language of
the statute has remained essentially unchanged,47 courts' interpreta-
tions have varied widely through the years.
For almost 200 years, courts viewed enhanced damages as a com-
pensatory remedy. In 1876, the Supreme Court noted that the power
to increase damages was intended to ensure that patentees were fully
compensated in situations where formal damage calculations might
yield less than sufficient recompense. 48 The Supreme Court reaf-
firmed this view in Clark v. Wooster ten years later.49 A court in the
Northern District of Illinois, in a 1946 opinion discussing the enhanced
41. Id. § 5(c)(2)(B).
42. Id. § 5(c)(2)(C).
43. Id. § 5(c)(3).
44. Id.
45. The proposed legislation grounds the willfulness requirement in legislation rather than
judicial interpretation and implicitly eliminates the affirmative duty of due care.
46. See infra notes 48-91 and accompanying text.
47. Compare Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 14, 5 Stat. 117, 123 ("power... to render judgment
for any sum above the amount found by such verdict as the actual damages.., according to the
circumstances of the case"), with 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) ("the court may increase the damages
up to three times the amount found or assessed.").
48. Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U.S. 64, 69-70 (1876).
49. The Supreme Court stated that:
It is a general rule in patent cases, that established license fees are the best measure of
damages that can be used. There may be damages beyond this, such as the expense and
trouble the plaintiff has been put to by the defendant, and any special inconvenience he
has suffered from the wrongful acts of the defendant; but these are more properly the
2009] 1051
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damages provisions of the law, stated that "the statute is not penal but
remedial in character and that the damages contemplated may be
awarded whether the wrong was intentional or unwitting. ' 50 Thus,
whether or not the infringement was willful was hardly dispositive.
The court further stated, "the weight of authority is that the demand
for treble damages in an infringement suit is remedial. 51
The view of courts regarding the purpose of enhanced damages be-
gan to shift in the 1960s and 1970s. In 1961, the Seventh Circuit cited
the determination of willfulness as a fundamental principle for treb-
ling damages. 52 Then, in 1969, the Second Circuit stated that
"[a]wards of increased damages are made sparingly and only when a
clear showing of deliberate infringement justifies the exercise of the
Court's discretion. '53 In 1979, the Court of Claims stated that "[c]ases
granting multiplied damages to victims of private infringers have a pu-
nitive ring, punishing those infringements characterized as 'willful and
deliberate.' ' '54 Thus, while the statutory language remained essen-
tially unchanged, 55 courts' interpretation of the purpose of the availa-
bility of enhanced damages had gone from primarily compensatory or
remedial in nature with an element of punishment,56 to strictly puni-
tive, requiring a showing of willfulness. 57
Milgo Electronic Corp. v. United Business Communications, Inc.
went one step further in 1980, granting treble damages "because [the]
defendant has knowingly, deliberately, willfully and wantonly in-
fringed the patents. '58 Although the court did not require all of the
elements to award treble damages, it showed a shift from the reason-
ing of many courts as to the purpose of enhanced damages.59 How-
ever, while courts tended to require willfulness as a prerequisite to an
award of enhanced damages throughout the 1980s, many courts did
subjects of allowance by the court under the authority given to it to increase the
damages.
Clark v. Wooster, 119 U.S. 322, 326 (1886).
50. Activated Sludge, Inc. v. Sanitary Dist. of Chi., 64 F. Supp. 25, 35 (N.D. I11. 1946).
51. Id.
52. "Certain fundamental principles control the situations. A determination as to wilfulness
enters into the fixing of liability upon which a claim for treble damages for infringement is
based." Copease Mfg. Co. v. Am. Photocopy Equip. Co., 298 F.2d 772, 783-84 (7th Cir. 1961).
53. Am. Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 415 F.2d 373, 378 (2d Cir. 1969).
54. Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 969 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
55. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
56. Activated Sludge, 64 F. Supp. at 35.
57. Leesona, 599 F.2d at 969 ("But increased damages are awarded only for a clear showing of
willful and deliberate infringement.").
58. Milgo Elec. Corp. v. United Bus. Commc'n, Inc., 623 F.2d 645, 662 (10th Cir. 1980).
59. See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
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not require willfulness. 60 For example, in 1981, the Third Circuit
stated that "[t]he statutory authority to increase the patentee's dam-
ages is often used as a penalty... when.., the defendant has acted in
bad faith. It is also clear that the enhancement of damages may serve
a remedial purpose."'61 The court further explained that "[b]ecause it
is often difficult in patent litigation to measure with mathematical pre-
cision a patentee's damages, the enhancement provision of the statute
is designed to permit, inter alia, adequate compensation for an in-
fringement where strict legal rules would not afford it."'62
The Supreme Court weighed in somewhat indirectly on the issue in
1983 in General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp.63 The Court addressed
an award of interest under 35 U.S.C. § 284, which provides that
neither awards for interest nor awards of enhanced damages require
any special finding-the decision is left to the discretion of the court.64
The Court in Devex reasoned that because § 284 was silent as to re-
strictions when a court may award interest, whereas § 285 required
exceptional circumstances with respect to attorneys' fees, Congress in-
tended that there be no such restriction on interest awards. 65 In De-
vex, the Court explained that awards of interest should be given
"where necessary to afford the plaintiff full compensation for the in-
fringement. '66 Thus, in 1983, the Supreme Court still recognized a
remedial element within § 284.67 In fact, the Eighth Circuit corrected
a lower court which had required "exceptional" circumstances to en-
hance damages.68 The court cited Devex to explain that the excep-
tional circumstances standard of § 285 was not incorporated into
§ 284, and that the jury's finding of willful or wanton infringement
would ordinarily be "sufficient to support an award of increased dam-
ages" under § 284.69
60. In re Seagate Tech. LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1383-84 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Gajarsa, J., concurring).
61. Trio Process Corp. v. Goldstein's Sons, Inc., 638 F.2d 661, 662 (3d Cir. 1981).
62. Id. at 663.
63. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648 (1983).
64. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
65. Devex, 461 U.S. at 653. The holding in Devex in relation to interest awards "applies with
equal force to enhanced damages." In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1383-84 (Gajarsa, J., concurring).
66. Devex, 461 U.S. at 654.
67. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1380-81. The distinction between remedial and punitive en-
hanced damages is important because if the award is punitive in nature, it ought to require an
additional element of intent, whereas if the award is remedial or compensatory, mental state is
not relevant to the award.
68. Saturn Mfg. Inc. v. Williams Patent Crusher & Pulverizer, 713 F.2d 1347, 1358 (8th Cir.
1983).
69. Id.
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DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
In 1983, the Federal Circuit recognized the dual nature70 of en-
hanced damages in two cases. 71 First, in Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., the
Federal Circuit explained that the trial court could enhance damages
above a reasonable royalty "so that the award is 'adequate to compen-
sate for the infringement.' 72 The court was concerned that awarding
only a reasonable royalty meant that infringers would be in a "heads-
I-win, tails-you-lose" position.73 The court said that this increase
could be seen as either "a reasonable royalty for an infringer,"74 or as
"an increase in the reasonable royalty determined by the court. '75
Thus, the Federal Circuit was not concerned with whether this was
seen as remedial or punitive as long as there was adequate compensa-
tion for the infringement. 76
Second, the court discussed the dual nature of enhanced damages in
Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co. 77 One of the is-
sues on appeal to the Federal Circuit was whether prejudgment inter-
est should have been awarded on the enhanced portion of the
damages. 78 The key to determining whether it was appropriate to
award the interest on the enhanced portion was whether the enhanced
portion was remedial or punitive. 79 This debate shows that the court
recognized the possibility of both remedial and punitive purposes of
§ 284 enhanced damages. The court explained that because the en-
hancement was based on a finding of willful infringement, the increase
was punitive.80
The Federal Circuit continued to allow compensatory enhanced
damages until Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing and Litho-
70. Enhanced damages may serve as compensatory or remedial, punitive, or a combination of
both.
71. Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Mor-
rison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
72. Stickle, 716 F.2d at 1563.
73. Id. (quoting Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1158 (6th Cir.
1978)). The "heads-I-win, tails-you-lose" situation occurs when the patentee is unwilling to li-
cense his patent, but the infringer is able to either get a compulsory license through the court, or
if no infringement is found, does not need a license. This violates the patentee's right to exclude
others from the use of his invention.
74. A reasonable royalty for an infringer would not necessarily be the same as a reasonable
royalty negotiated between two parties acting in good faith before any infringing activity.
75. Stickle, 716 F.2d at 1563.
76. Id. If the court looked at the increase above the reasonable royalty as a royalty for an
infringer, this would be more remedial or compensatory. If the court saw it as an increase on the
reasonable royalty established by the court, it would be more punitive in nature.
77. 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
78. Id. at 1389.
79. Id.
80. Id.
1054 [Vol. 58:1047
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graphing Co. in 1991.81 In Beatrice Foods, the Federal Circuit an-
swered the question of whether damages could be trebled "on the
theory that the enhanced award was necessary to compensate ade-
quately the patentee for the infringement. '82 The answer was a re-
sounding no.83 The court explained, "Damages cannot be enhanced
to award the patentee additional compensation to rectify what the dis-
trict court views as an inadequacy in the actual damages awarded. '84
The case involved the destruction of important documents by the in-
fringer which made it difficult to determine actual damages.85 In this
situation, courts must resolve any doubts against the infringer. 86 The
court explained that the appropriate route for a patentee who feels
undercompensated is an appeal, not an enhancement of actual dam-
ages.87 The court cautioned that "enhanced damages may be awarded
only as a penalty for ... willful infringement or bad faith. '88
In 1999, Odetics reaffirmed the Beatrice line of cases by stating that
"[t]he law is clear that while willful infringement may allow enhanced
damages, such a finding does not compel the district court to grant
them."'89 Finally, in 2004, the Federal Circuit explicitly held that will-
81. 923 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1991). In 1987, the Federal Circuit described infringement as a
spectrum ranging "from unknowing, or accidental, to deliberate, or reckless, disregard of a pat-
entee's legal rights," and that the totality of the circumstances should be taken into account in
determining willfulness. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d 1120, 1125-26 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
The court stated that willfulness is a factor, but that equity should determine the award, with
multiplied damages as an option. Id.
82. Beatrice Foods, 923 F.2d at 1577.
83. Id. at 1578 (citing cases dating back to the Federal Circuit's inception in 1982 and stating
that "it is well-settled that enhancement of damages must be premised on willful infringement or
bad faith").
84. Id. at 1579.
85. Id. at 1577.
86. Id. at 1579.
87. Id.
88. Beatrice Foods, 923 F.2d at 1579-80. In 1992, the Federal Circuit affirmed Beatrice
Foods's view and listed nine considerations to take into account when determining whether in-
fringement was willful. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826-27 (Fed. Cir. 1992). To
help determine willfulness using the totality of the circumstances, the court gave a number of
factors to consider:
(1) whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or design of another . . . (2)
whether the infringer, when he knew of the other's patent protection, investigated the
scope of the patent and formed a good-faith belief that it was invalid or that it was not
infringed ... (3) the infringer's behavior as a party to the litigation ... (4) [d]efendant's
size and financial condition . . . (5) [c]loseness of the case . . . (6) [d]uration of de-
fandant's misconduct . . . (7) [r]emedial action by the defendant . . . (8) [d]efendant's
motivation for harm ... (9) [w]hether defendant attempted to conceal its misconduct.
Id.
89. Odetics Inc. v. Storage Tech Corp., 185 F.3d 1259, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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fulness was now required for enhanced damages.90 Thus, since Bea-
trice Foods, courts have consistently followed the rule that enhanced
damages are punitive in nature and require a showing of willfulness. 9'
2. Underwater Devices and the Affirmative Duty of Due Care
The affirmative duty of due care issue presented in Underwater De-
vices arose from a claim that the district court erroneously found will-
ful infringement.92 The patent at issue was a method and apparatus
for laying underwater pipe.93 Plaintiff offered the defendant a license
for a project for $200,000, but the defendant refused the offer and
used the infringing method and apparatus anyway. 94 The defendant's
in-house counsel and a regional manager decided to negotiate a li-
cense only if sued, and then only for the cost of litigation, not a rea-
sonable royalty.95 Their primary reasoning was their general
observation that most patents are invalidated, and thus the risk was
minimal.96 This determination by the defendant was not based on an
evaluation of the pertinent patents; in fact, the file history for the pat-
ents was not ordered until after infringement began, and a non-in-
fringement opinion was not received until after suit had been
brought.97 Citing the lax attitude of the defendant in determining
whether or not their activities constituted infringement, the court set
forth the affirmative duty standard:
Where, as here, a potential infringer has actual notice of another's
patent rights, he has an affirmative duty to exercise due care to de-
termine whether or not he is infringing.... Such an affirmative duty
90. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge Gmbh v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1342
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (discussing the Supreme Court's view that willfulness is a conduit for enhanced
damages, used to show the Court's disfavor of the intentional disregard of legal rights).
91. Despite the fairly clear and unambiguous language in Beatrice Foods, there has been the
occasional outlier. For example, in King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, the Federal Circuit recog-
nized that there may still be situations in which enhanced damages are compensatory or reme-
dial in nature:
The problem of inadequate compensation when damages are based on a reasonable
royalty has been expressly recognized in several cases. . . . The solutions suggested
include awards of treble damages, attorney fees and prejudgment interest ... and dis-
cretionary awards of greater than a reasonable royalty[.] . . . Such discretionary in-
creases may be appropriate where plaintiffs cannot prove direct and foreseeable
damages in the form of lost profits.
King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 951 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
92. Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
93. Id. at 1382.
94. Id. at 1384-85.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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includes, inter alia, the duty to seek and obtain competent legal ad-
vice before the initiation of any possible infringing activity.98
The court thereby introduced the affirmative duty to obtain advice of
counsel upon notice of another's patent rights before proceeding with
any potentially infringing acts.
3. EchoStar and Broad Subject Matter Waiver
The Federal Circuit affirmed the broad subject matter waiver prin-
ciple in In re EchoStar Communications Corp.99 Defendant EchoStar
chose to rely on the advice of in-house counsel as a defense to willful
infringement. 100 After being sued, EchoStar obtained additional ad-
vice from an outside law firm, but chose not to rely on it.101 The issue
was the interpretation of the lower court's discovery order based on
the waiver of attorney-client privilege. 102 It was not contested that the
in-house counsel's privilege was waived; the key issues were whether
the work product of the outside counsel that was not relied upon had
to be produced and whether outside counsel's work product that was
never presented to EchoStar was discoverable.10 3
The court explained the scope of the waiver, stating that "[o]nce a
party announces that it will rely on advice of counsel ... the attorney-
client privilege is waived. ' 104 Further, "the waiver applies to all other
communications relating to the same subject matter. ' 10 5 The court af-
firmed that EchoStar's reliance on in-house counsel waived the attor-
ney-client privilege for any and all communications relating to the
subject matter of infringement, but that the work product that was not
communicated to EchoStar was not a "communication" and ths not
subject to discovery.106 Thus, the scope of the attorney-client waiver
was determined not by the type of attorney making the communica-
tion, but by the subject matter of the opinion presented. Thus, when
an opinion letter is presented as a defense, all communications relat-
ing to infringement, validity, enforceability, claim construction, and
other topics that are the subject of the opinion letter become
discoverable.
98. Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d. at 1389-90.
99. In re EchoStar Commc'n Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
100. Id. at 1296-97.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1299.
105. In re EchoStar Commc'n, 448 F.3d at 1299 (citing Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co., 412
F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
106. Id.
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The combination of the affirmative duty with broad subject matter
waiver of the attorney-client privilege was a heavy burden for accused
infringers. Potential infringers were first required to obtain costly
non-infringement opinions. Then, in order to avoid willfulness, ac-
cused infringers were required to present their non-infringement opin-
ions as a defense, which waived their attorney-client privilege with
respect to the subject matter of the opinion. Because non-infringe-
ment opinions deal with the core issues of the case, that waiver often
extends to trial counsel, which severely impairs counsel's effective-
ness. The Federal Circuit eased these burdens when it abandoned the
affirmative duty and narrowed the scope of the attorney-client waiver
in Seagate.107
III. SUBJECT OPINION: IN RE SEAGATE TECHNOLOGIES, LLC
In Seagate, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, reaffirmed the will-
fulness requirement to increase damages, refined the definition of
willfulness, and abandoned the affirmative duty of due care. 108 In
Seagate the Federal Circuit resolved a dispute over the scope of a Spe-
cial Master's discovery production order109 that required defendants
to produce "all opinions communicated to it."110 The defendants
urged that "opinions" should be construed to mean only formal opin-
ions given in response to a request for an opinion."' The plaintiffs,
however, sought discovery of any internal communications relating to
the same subject as the opinions, including materials on which coun-
sel's opinion was based. 112 The Federal Circuit determined the appro-
107. See infra notes 131-144 and accompanying text.
108. In re Seagate Tech. LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The issue of willfulness was not
specifically before the court, but the court felt that the issue was antecedent to the dispute con-
cerning the proper scope of discovery which was before the court. Id. at 1371-72. The court
thus stated that "addressing willfulness is neither hypothetical nor advisory." Id. At trial, Sea-
gate used an opinion of counsel as a defense to the claim of willful patent infringement and
enhanced damages. Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp., 224 F.R.D. 98, 103 (S.D.N.Y.
2004). The law at the time considered the production of an opinion letter a waiver of the attor-
ney-client privilege. Id. Seagate challenged the extent of the waiver beyond just the opinion to
trial counsel communications. Id. Thus, willfulness is before the Federal Circuit because the
attorney-client privilege waiver was caused by producing the opinion letter which sought to de-
fend against a finding of willful infringement. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371-72.
109. Convolve, 224 F.R.D. at 99-102.
110. Id. at 101.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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priate scope of waiver, while also taking the opportunity to revisit the
willfulness doctrine. 1 3
This Part addresses several aspects of the court's decision. Section
A discusses the court's reaffirmation of the principle that "an award of
enhanced damages requires a showing of willful infringement. ' 114
Section B introduces the Federal Circuit's two part definition of will-
fulness, based on the "objectively high likelihood" and "known or
should have known" test, which requires at least objective reckless-
ness for a finding of willfulness.11 5 Section C analyzes the court's deci-
sion to abandon the affirmative duty of due care, including the duty to
obtain the opinion of counsel. 116 Finally, Section D explains how the
court narrowed the scope of the attorney-client waiver.117
A. Reaffirmation of the Requirement of Willfulness
Because § 284 provides no guidelines for when enhanced damages
are appropriate, the court accepted and reaffirmed the requirement
that to increase damages, there must be a finding of willful infringe-
ment.118 The court, however, cautioned that a finding of willfulness
does not require that damages be increased.1' 9 Trial courts retain dis-
cretion in awarding enhanced damages, and a finding of willfulness
makes that option available.1 20 The new test for willfulness in in-
fringement is the objective recklessness test. 21
B. Definition of Willful Patent Infringement
The duty of care stated in Underwater Devices was more like negli-
gence than willfulness. 122 In order to return the definition of willful-
ness to the generally understood meaning of willful in the broad, civil
context, the Federal Circuit in Seagate overruled Underwater Devices
in this respect.1 23 However, the Federal Circuit recognized that the
113. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371-72 ("The ultimate dispute in this case is the proper scope
of discovery .... [I]t is indisputable that the proper legal standard for willful infringement in-
forms the relevance of evidence relating to that issue and ... the proper scope of discovery.").
114. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1368; see infra notes 118-121 and accompanying text.
115. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371; see infra notes 122-130 and accompanying text.
116. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371; see infra notes 131-137 and accompanying text.
117. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1372-76; see infra notes 138-144 and accompanying text.
118. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1368.
119. Id.
120. Id. ("[A] finding of willfulness does not require an award of enhanced damages; it merely
permits it.").
121. Id. at 1371.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1371 (citing Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201 (2007)).
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term reckless was not self-defining. 124 The court looked to copyright
law and a recent Supreme Court decision, Safeco Insurance Co. of
America v. Burr, to determine the proper meaning of willful. 125 Anal-
ogizing patent law to copyright law, the court concluded that trial
courts' decisions to enhance damages should be based on a finding of
willful infringement. 126 Because "willful" was not defined in the dam-
ages statute, the court followed consistent precedent and found that
the term "willful" includes reckless behavior.127 The court in Seagate
accepted the general civil law definition of recklessness that the Su-
preme Court used in Safeco1 28
Specifically, the Seagate court set out a two part test for willfulness:
[T]o establish willful infringement, a patentee must show by clear
and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objec-
tively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a
valid patent .... [T]he patentee must also demonstrate that this ob-
jectively-defined risk .. .was either known or so obvious that it
should have been known to the accused infringer. 129
Following Seagate, in order to prove willfulness, a patentee must
demonstrate first that the accused infringer acted in the face of a great
risk, and second, that the risk was or should have been known. The
court's ultimate conclusion with respect to enhanced damages was
that "proof of willful infringement permitting enhanced damages re-
quires at least a showing of objective recklessness."1 30 This new stan-
dard was a significant change from the old standard that allowed
patentees to escape the burden of proving willfulness by simply point-
ing to the fact that the accused infringer had notice of the patentee's
rights, which then forced accused infringers to show a lack of willful-
ness. Now, patentees bear the burden of persuasion that is properly
theirs as plaintiffs.
124. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
125. Id. at 1370-71.
126. Id. ("Under the Copyright Act ... trial courts have discretion to enhance the damages
... for willful infringement"); see also 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006).
127. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1370-71. The Supreme Court in Safeco confirmed that "[t]he
standard civil usage thus counsels reading [willful] ... as reaching reckless." Safeco, 127 S. Ct. at
2209. Note that civil and criminal definitions of "willful" are different, the former including
reckless, the latter requiring "knowing." Id. at 2209 n.9.
128. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1370-71.
129. Id. at 1371.
130. Id.
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C. Abandonment of Affirmative Duty of Due Care
The Federal Circuit also decided to abandon the affirmative duty of
due care established in Underwater Devices.131 One of the reasons for
the change in the court's opinion was the change in attitude towards
infringers in general. 132 The Underwater Devices affirmative duty of
due care for possible infringers was announced "at a time 'when wide-
spread disregard of patent rights was undermining the national inno-
vation incentive.' '"133 Most recently, the affirmative duty created a
dilemma for accused infringers: they could offer an opinion letter but
lose the attorney-client privilege, or they could withhold the invalidity
opinion but create a negative inference that either no opinion was ob-
tained or that the opinion obtained was unfavorable.1 34 In Knorr-
Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge Gmbh v. Dana Corp., the Fed-
eral Circuit precluded courts from drawing negative inferences from
failure to offer an opinion letter. 135 Then, in Seagate, the court reaf-
firmed that reliance on favorable advice of counsel or failure to prof-
fer favorable advice "is not dispositive of the willfulness inquiry" and
cannot be used to draw negative inferences.1 36 Thus, the Federal Cir-
cuit entirely abandoned the affirmative duty of due care requirement
by neutralizing the dispositive nature of opinion letters of counsel and
precluding courts from drawing negative inferences.1 37
D. Narrowing of the Attorney-Client Privilege Waiver
Seagate also considered whether presenting pretrial advice of coun-
sel as a defense waived the attorney-client privilege with separate trial
counsel as well.1 38 Recognizing the purpose of the privilege, to en-
courage full and frank communication between attorneys and their
clients, and the "significantly different functions of trial counsel and
opinion counsel," the court was reluctant to allow the broad extension
of waiver to trial counsel communications.1 39 The court also made an
131. Id. ("Because we abandon the affirmative duty of due care, we also reemphasize that
there is no affirmative obligation to obtain opinion of counsel.").
132. Id. at 1369.
133. Id. (quoting Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge Gmbh v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d
1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see also Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717
F.2d 1380, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (explaining that part of the attorney's advice regarding non-
infringement was that in eighty percent of cases the patent is found invalid, so the risk of an
infringement action was minimal).
134. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1369-70.
135. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1441.
136. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1369-70.
137. Id. at 1371.
138. Id. at 1372-76.
139. Id. at 1373.
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important distinction between pre-complaint and post-complaint filing
activities of the accused infringer, stating that "a willfulness claim...
must necessarily be grounded exclusively in the accused infringer's
pre-filing conduct," because "when a complaint is filed, a patentee
must have a good faith basis for alleging willful infringement.' 40 In
order for a plaintiff to receive treble damages for post-filing conduct,
she must request a preliminary injunction.1 41 If a court denies that
injunction, it is unlikely to find the conduct sufficiently willful to de-
serve enhanced damages. 142 The court explained that because trial
counsel's advice does not typically form a basis for the defendant's
pre-filing activities, it is not per se part of the waived subject matter
when defendants rely on an opinion as a defense to willful infringe-
ment.143 The court did not, however, expressly limit the waiver to
opinion counsel. Rather it eliminated the automatic waiver of the
trial counsel privilege but reserved the determination of the ultimate
scope of the waiver for the trial courts.144
IV. ANALYSIS
The Federal Circuit's extensive overhaul of the willfulness doctrine
in Seagate is precisely in line with the long-felt need for sweeping
changes by many practitioners and patent holders.1 45 The amicus
briefs for the Knorr-Bremse decision "demonstrate collectively that
the willfulness doctrine has evolved into a force that operates arbitrar-
ily and without uniformity and that imposes unnecessary expenses
upon both litigants."'1 46 Seagate resolved a number of the outstanding
issues with the willfulness doctrine. This Part analyzes each of the
140. Id. at 1374.
141. Id.
142. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1374 (explaining that the substantial question about invalidity
or infringement that would preclude a preliminary injunction would also form a basis for deny-
ing enhanced damages).
143. Id. at 1373.
144. The court made it clear that the scope of waiver determination remained in the hands of
trial court judges:
In sum, we hold, as a general proposition, that asserting the advice of counsel defense
and disclosing opinions of opinion counsel do not constitute waiver of the attorney-
client privilege for communications with trial counsel. We do not purport to set out an
absolute rule. Instead, trial courts remain free to exercise their discretion in unique
circumstances.
Id. at 1374-75.
145. See infra notes 151-258 and accompanying text.
146. Robert P. Taylor, Willfulness After Knorr-Bremse-The Major Problems Persist, 6036
PLI 371, 375 (2005). Specifically, "critics complained that imposing an affirmative duty to obtain
such legal opinions ... subjects potential defendants to costs far out of proportion with any
benefit to the patent owner or the objectives of the patent system." Id.
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four main holdings in Seagate. Section A analyzes the narrowed scope
of the attorney-client privilege waiver when presenting an opinion of
counsel, focusing on the principle's disadvantages prior to Seagate.14 7
Section B discusses the abandonment of the affirmative duty of due
care for potential infringers upon actual notice of an existing pat-
ent.148 Section C reviews the court's clarification of willfulness and
the essential elements for a willfulness determination. 149 Finally, Sec-
tion D examines the reaffirmation of the willfulness requirement for
enhanced damage awards.' 50
A. Narrowing the Attorney-Client Privilege Waiver
The Federal Circuit's decision in Seagate appropriately narrowed
the scope of the attorney-client privilege waiver when presenting an
opinion-of-counsel as a defense. The law prior to Seagate forced ac-
cused infringers to make a choice when faced with allegations of will-
fulness.151 Defendants could either present an opinion of counsel as a
defense to willful infringement (which required them to waive the at-
torney client privilege), or they could withhold the opinion of counsel
and preserve the attorney client privilege (which caused them to lose
the defensive power of the favorable opinion). Although Knorr-
Bremse eliminated the adverse inference from a failure to present an
opinion of counsel, the dilemma faced by defendants was un-
resolved. 52 This Section analyzes the failures of the broad waiver
principle. The first Subsection discusses how the broad waiver princi-
ple frustrated the public policy benefits afforded by an honest opinion
of counsel. 153 The second Subsection reviews how the broad waiver
147. See infra notes 151-172 and accompanying text; see also In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at
1374-75 ("[Als a general proposition .... asserting the advice of counsel defense and disclosing
opinions of opinion counsel do not constitute waiver of the attorney-client privilege for commu-
nications with trial counsel.").
148. See infra notes 173-228 and accompanying text; see also In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at
1370-72 ("Because we abandon the affirmative duty of due care, we also reemphasize that there
is no affirmative obligation to obtain opinion of counsel.").
149. See infra notes 229-245 and accompanying text; see also In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at
1370-72 ("[T]o establish willful infringement, a patentee must show by clear and convincing
evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions consti-
tuted infringement of a valid patent.").
150. See infra notes 246-258 and accompanying text; see also In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1368
("Absent a statutory guide, we have held that an award of enhanced damages requires a showing
of willful infringement.").
151. If there is no allegation of willful infringement, whether or not there is reliance on an
opinion of counsel is moot because patent infringement is a strict liability offense.
152. Brief of Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Federation Internationale Des Conseils En
Propriete Industrielle, in Support of Neither Party, In re Seagate, 497 F.3d 1360 (No. 06-830)
[hereinafter Brief of Federation Internationale].
153. See infra notes 156-161 and accompanying text.
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principle inhibited the "efficient, fair and expedient adjudication of
patent cases.' 15 4 The final Subsection describes alternative, less intru-
sive means of obtaining the same relevant information that would be
obtained through the broad waiver.155
1. Frustrating Public Policy
A broad waiver principle harms the public policies of promoting
innovation by awarding patents and providing notice to potential in-
fringers. When a patent is granted, one of the benefits the public re-
ceives is a disclosure describing how the invention works. This allows
the public to effectively design around and improve the invention dur-
ing the patent term and fully utilize the invention when the patent
expires. A broad attorney-client waiver doctrine, however, discour-
ages "full and frank communication between attorneys and their cli-
ents.' 1 56  If an attorney provides honest consideration of factors
tending towards both non-infringement and infringement, the opinion
letter would be damning, rather than defensive, at trial. 57 But an
honest, balanced opinion is beneficial to clients, especially corpora-
tions, who need to know the real risks before deciding on a course of
action relating to a product. 58 An opinion letter is much more than a
defense to willful infringement. It aids clients in designing around
patents by informing an inventor about the legal limits of the prior
invention, thus allowing them to ensure that a new product does not
infringe and know the available scope of patent protection for the
154. En Banc Brief of Amici Curiae Avery Dennison Corp. et al. in Support of Seagate Tech.,
LLC, In re Seagate, 497 F.3d 1360 (No. 06-830) [hereinafter Brief of Avery Dennison]. See also
Brief of Federation Internationale, supra note 152, at 4 (stating that international clients and
parties to litigation in the United States need "certainty and predictability of the judicial process,
including discovery procedures."); infra notes 162-164 and accompanying text.
155. See infra notes 165-172 and accompanying text.
156. The "full and frank disclosure" language is found in Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.
383, 389 (1981). The discouraging effect of the dilemma is described in Brief of Avery Dennison,
supra note 154, at 3; Brief of the American Bar Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner
at 3-4, In re Seagate, 497 F.3d 1360 (No. 06-830) [hereinafter Brief of ABA]; Mark A. Lemley &
Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law's Willfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1085
(2003); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Pharmaceutical Research and Mfrs. of America in Sup-
port of Petitioner at 19-20, In re Seagate, 497 F.3d 1360 (No. 06-830) [hereinafter Brief of Phar-
maceutical Research] (explaining that a combination of broad attorney-client waiver and the
affirmative duty led to poorly written opinions based on less than all the facts).
157. Brief of Avery Denison, supra note 154, at 3.
158. Brief of Amicus Curiae, Biotechnology Industry Organization, In Support of Petitioner
at 5, In re Seagate, 497 F.3d 1360 (No. 06-830) [hereinafter Brief of Biotechnology Industry]
("Corporate decision makers expect such opinions to provide information needed for immediate
business decisions, such as whether to seek a license, to make changes to their activities, or to
confidently declare to potential partners or investors their belief they have freedom-to-
operate.").
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product.159 A broad waiver principle that discourages forthright opin-
ions from counsel would be contrary to patent law's core premise that
that the public benefits from legitimate attempts to design around pat-
ents.160 It would also cripple an attorney's ability to provide accurate
information to a defendant during a trial. 161
2. Limiting Efficiency and Fairness
Broad waiver leads to increased litigation and litigation expenses.1 62
Often, opinions are obtained with a focus on litigation which requires
minimizing potentially detrimental, discoverable communications.
These slanted opinions do not allow clients to make fully informed
decisions. "Less informed decisions mean increased mistakes. It may
be accidental infringement because the decision is based on erroneous
beliefs of invalidity, unenforceability, or narrow claim scope. This
causes unnecessary litigation and litigation costs, wasted design efforts
and resources, and advances neither innovation nor competition. '163
Attorneys may be forced to choose between an accurate and useful
opinion for a client, hoping to avoid litigation, or a litigation-proof
opinion that provides no real insight. Essentially, opinions written
with an eye towards future litigation are useless for research and de-
velopment purposes because they are focused on the legal, rather than
inventive, aspects of the patent. As a result, inventors may end up
wasting significant efforts aimlessly designing around prior art which
was already in the public domain.1 64
159. Brief of Avery Denison, supra note 154, at 4-5.
160. Id. It is possible that an attorney, fearing ramifications at trial, might give a client an
opinion unrealistically biased in favor of the client. This could discourage a client from designing
around the patent because he incorrectly believes he does not need to do so. In this manner, a
broad waiver could lead to increased, unintentional infringement, as well as less effective design-
arounds or none at all. Id. at 11.
161. Brief of ABA, supra note 156, at 6-8. Throughout the litigation process, an attorney
must advise his client of the changing value of various defenses based on additional information
that comes to light. Id. A broad waiver makes it dangerous to discuss such changing trial strate-
gies and risks, because such statements would be discovered through the waiver and may be seen
as a concession or admission. Id. This may "encourage clients to adopt a 'don't ask, don't tell'
approach with trial counsel." Id. at 8. This would create an undesirable chilling effect on hon-
esty in attorney-client communications. Id.
162. Brief of Amicus Curiae Federal Circuit Bar Ass'n in Support of Neither Party, In re
Seagate, 497 F.3d 1360 (No. 06-830) [hereinafter Brief of FCBA]. The duty to update would be
especially troublesome in a situation where the court determined that the privilege was waived.
Such would require trial counsel to continually update opposing counsel as to his trial strategy as
it changed throughout the trial. This would severely hinder trial counsel's ability to serve his
client effectively.
163. Brief of Avery Dennison, supra note 154, at 11.
164. Id.
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3. Less Intrusive Means
The attorney-client waiver does provide important information to
the opposing party that is necessary for an equitable trial, but a broad
waiver is not essential because that information is available through
other means.165 Opposing counsel has a right to know the circum-
stances surrounding the opinion, the research upon which the opinion
is based, and the qualifications of the individual giving the opinion.166
However, allowing the waiver might result in opinion counsel being
called as an adverse witness.167 Opposing counsel can obtain informa-
tion regarding the assumptions upon which counsel based his opinion
and any relevant changes in the law or facts of the case through an
effective cross-examination of the opinion counsel. 168 Opinion coun-
sel's qualifications can be determined through deposition or discov-
ery.169 The accuracy of the opinion can be determined by reviewing
the document itself.170 Experts could be called to testify as to the ac-
curacy, honesty, and reliability of the opinion. Because the evidence
is available through less intrusive means, "the probative value of the
evidence to be obtained from trial counsel [through waiver] is far out-
weighed by the factors that support the privilege."1 71 A broad attor-
ney-client privilege waiver is neither the best nor the least intrusive
means of discovering the pertinent information.
The court's narrowing of the scope of waiver in Seagate should alle-
viate the aforementioned burdens on the judicial system and the pub-
lic. Broad waiver was intended to increase the information available
to ascertain the truth, but led to the opposite. By limiting the scope of
the waiver, attorneys will be able to communicate more fully and
frankly with their clients. In rare circumstances when a court believes
that the communications should be discoverable,172 the information
disclosed will be more indicative of the truth, rather than a well-for-
mulated imitation of it by a litigation-minded attorney. More forth-
coming opinions will allow potential infringers to more effectively
165. Id. at 3.
166. Id. at 16-17.
167. Id. at 2-3; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Echostar Communications Corp. et al., In re
Seagate, 497 F.3d 1360 (No. 06-830) [hereinafter Brief of Echostar Comm'ns Corp. et al.]. In a
number of jurisdictions, if counsel is required to give testimony relating to an essential fact or
that would be adverse to his client, he could be disqualified. See Brief of Avery Dennison, supra
note 154, at 14-15.
168. Brief of Avery Dennison, supra note 154, at 2.
169. Id. at 16.
170. Id.
171. Brief of Pharmaceutical Research, supra note 156, at 6; see also FED. R. EvID. 403.
172. See In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1374-75 ("We do not purport to set out an absolute rule.
Instead, trial courts remain free to exercise their discretion in unique circumstances.").
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avoid infringement, which will decrease infringement suits. Thus, a
narrower scope of waiver will encourage honest, useful communica-
tions, avoid duplicative research efforts, and reduce the judicial
caseload.
B. Abandoning the Affirmative Duty
The Federal Circuit was correct in expanding the Knorr-Bremse de-
cision by abandoning the affirmative duty altogether. After Underwa-
ter Devices, the affirmative duty effectively became a requirement for
a defendant to obtain an opinion of counsel. 173 Although reasonable
arguments exist for both maintaining and eliminating the duty, the
burden in willful infringement cases became far too unbalanced to de-
fendants' detriment to retain the affirmative duty. 174 This Section
analyzes the opposing views held on this subject. The first Subsection
explores two views in favor of maintaining the affirmative duty; the
affirmative duty struck a proper balance between predictability and
flexibility, 175 and the affirmative duty was a means of protecting our
nation's valuable intellectual property regime.176 The final Subsection
analyzes arguments for eliminating the affirmative duty and concludes
that the Federal Circuit was correct in abandoning the duty at this
time. 177
1. Arguments for Maintaining the Affirmative Duty
There are two main views regarding the justification for retaining
the affirmative duty. According to the first, the affirmative duty pro-
vides a stable and predictable system that properly deters infringers
while maintaining enough flexibility to balance equitable concerns. 178
Because "settlement can often be forced by the mere possibility of a
finding that the infringement was willful," potential infringers will
more likely consider licensing or at least think twice about the harsh
ramifications if they are caught, and thus infringement is deterred. 179
If this possibility were removed and potential infringers only faced the
173. Brief of FCBA, supra note 162, at 12.
174. Brief of Biotechnology Industry, supra note 158, at 15.
175. See infra notes 178-183 and accompanying text.
176. See infra notes 184-192 and accompanying text.
177. See infra notes 193-228 and accompanying text.
178. Jon E. Wright, Comment, Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced Damages-Evolu-
tion and Analysis, 10 GEO. MASON L. REv. 97 (2001). This argument, however, was made six
years prior to Seagate and the author's position is not that the affirmative duty should never be
abolished, but that doing so would be inappropriate at that time. The duty was created at the
peak of anti-patent sentiment in the United States.
179. Id. at 97.
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cost of a reasonable royalty (and their own attorneys' fees), there
would be "little incentive to seek a license," and the deterrence of
infringement would deteriorate.180 Without a strong affirmative duty,
courts would award enhanced damages less frequently, which would
weaken the incentive for potential infringers to be cautious, thus
weakening patent protection, discouraging innovation, and ultimately
harming the public.181 One scholar has argued that uncertainty leads
to litigation, which leads to clarification by the courts, which then
leads to certainty.182 Hence, uncertainty is not permanent and may be
an essential stage in the process of achieving certainty. 83 In sum, this
view holds that the affirmative duty requirement successfully and eq-
uitably deters infringement and that the chilling effect on corpora-
tions' innovation is only temporary.
The second view contends that the affirmative duty reflects a funda-
mental premise "that intellectual property is worth protecting.' t 84
The duty of care strengthened the U.S. patent system and the U.S.
economy by mandating respect for patent rights.185 The duty of care
encourages potential infringers to obtain competent advice of coun-
sel, 18 6 which is a positive force in avoiding infringement. 8 7 It also
helps corporations and inventors design around existing patents. Both
avoiding infringement and designing around patents are decidedly
beneficial to the public.188 This view is critical of Seagate's retraction
of the affirmative duty because removing the affirmative duty "may
actually lead to more deplorable conduct. 189
180. Id. at 100.
181. Id. at 121.
182. Id. at 118-21 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 587-88 (5th ed.
1998)).
183. Id.
184. Brief for Amicus Curiae Bar Ass'n of the District of Columbia, in Support of Neither
Party at 2, In re Seagate Tech. LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (No. 06-830) [hereinafter
Brief of BADC].
185. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Philadelphia Intellectual Property Law Ass'n, In re Seagate,
497 F.3d 1360 (No. 06-830) [hereinafter Brief of Philadelphia IP Law Ass'n] ("Inventions con-
tinue to be developed here, in part because inventors and investors know that U.S. patents have
teeth and can be enforced with greater predictability than elsewhere.").
186. Whether or not the counsel that is obtained through this requirement was competent or
crafted specifically for the client's purposes is questioned in Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer
Nutzfahrzeuge Gmbh v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1351 (Fed Cir. 2004) (Dyk, J., dissenting)
("[T]he due care requirement has fostered ... a cottage industry of window-dressing legal
opinions.").
187. See Brief of BADC, supra note 184, at 4.
188. See Brief of Avery Dennison, supra note 154, at 4-6.
189. Brief of Philadelphia IP Law Ass'n, supra note 185, at 3-4. The brief asserts that the duty
of due care decreases the frequency of unlawful trespass on patent rights, so conversely, elimi-
nating the duty would increase the frequency of unlawful trespass on patent rights. Id.
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In eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. the Supreme Court held that
injunctions are no longer mandatory upon a finding of infringe-
ment.190 Injunctions had previously been a strong factor in deterring
infringement and forcing settlement when infringement was found.191
Without the threat of a mandatory injunction, removing the affirma-
tive duty would leave infringers free to do as they please with little
fear of recourse because all that would likely be assessed for damages
would be a reasonable royalty.1 92 In this manner, potential infringers
could force patentees to judicially license their patents against their
will. This would fly directly in the face of the exclusive right granted
to patentees. In sum, this second view focuses on the benefits to the
intellectual property regime afforded by the effective deterrence of
infringement through the affirmative duty.
2. The Federal Circuit Correctly Abandoned the Affirmative Duty
Even if the affirmative duty provided predictability and stability,
deterred infringement, and strengthened the intellectual property re-
gime, it was dangerously unbalanced in favor of patentees to the ulti-
mate detriment of the public. 93 The affirmative duty was "the
primary source of the ongoing problems with [the] willful infringe-
ment doctrine."'1 94 This Subsection analyzes the imperfections of the
affirmative duty. First, the affirmative duty of due care, with its at-
tendant duty to obtain the opinion of counsel, was contrary to Su-
preme Court precedent. 195 Second, it improperly shifted the burden
of proof and encouraged meritless claims. 196 Third, it created a dan-
gerous dilemma for defendants and undermined some of the basic
purposes of the patent system, forcing unnecessary expenditures with
190. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006).
191. Matthew D. Powers & Steven C. Carlson, The Evolution and Impact of the Doctrine of
Willful Patent Infringement, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53, 101 (2001). While discussing the theory
that treble damages do little to increase the deterrence already provided through a threat of
injunction, the author states that "[t]he possibility of an injunction provides a powerful source of
coercion for the patentee." Id.
192. Brief of Philadelphia IP Law Ass'n, supra note 185, at 3-4.
193. Andrew M. Newton, Encouraging Willful Infringement? Knorr-Bremse Leaves Due Care
in Patent Litigation in a State of Flux, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 91, 114 (2006) ("The public is
rewarded with great innovation when a proper balance is struck between protecting established
inventors rights and encouraging new inventors to make substantial strides to existing
inventions.").
194. William F. Lee, Michael J. Summersgill & Jordan L. Hirsch, The Doctrine of Willful Pat-
ent Infringement After Knorr-Bremse: Practical Problems & Recommendations, 7 SEDONA
CONF. J. 169, 179 (2006).
195. See infra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
196. See infra notes 203-207 and accompanying text.
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no attendant benefits and rewarding unjust behavior. 197 Finally, the
affirmative duty created uncertainty, improperly extended the patent
monopoly, and was no longer necessary to achieve its original policy
purposes. 198
a. Supreme Court Precedent
The affirmative duty allowed treble damages on a finding of mere
negligence, contrary to Supreme Court precedent in BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore,199 which requires that "the punitive damages
imposed on a defendant be based on reprehensible conduct, not negli-
gence. '' 200 Thus, reprehensible conduct-not simply negligent con-
duct-is required for punitive enhanced damages.201 Under pre-
Seagate case law, mere negligent failure to comply with the affirmative
duty was grounds for a finding of willfulness, which allowed a punitive
enhancement of damages. Because the affirmative duty "enable[d] a
patentee to recover enhanced or punitive damages based on a show-
ing of simple negligence," the Federal Circuit was correct to follow
Supreme Court precedent and abandon the affirmative duty of due
care.
202
b. Improper Burden Shifting
The affirmative duty improperly shifted the burden to the defen-
dant to show a lack of willfulness, rather than requiring the plaintiff
to demonstrate willfulness. 20 3 Thus, some argued that this burden
shift ought to be mitigated through the elimination of the due care
requirement.20 4 If, however the burden is shifted, it may result in re-
duced findings of willfulness which would then encourage infringers to
"infringe at will."'20 5 But willfulness is alleged in almost all patent in-
197. See infra notes 208-220 and accompanying text.
198. See infra notes 221-228 and accompanying text.
199. Brief of Pharmaceutical Research, supra note 156, at 12; see also Atmel Corp v. Silicon
Storage Tech., 202 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1102-03, 1107-08 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding willful infringe-
ment because there was not an adequate opinion, although there was no deliberate copying, no
poor litigation practices, and no motivation to injuriously infringe).
200. Brief of Pharmaceutical Research, supra note 156, at 12 (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-79 (1996)).
201. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) ("[P]unitive dam-
ages should only be awarded if the defendant's culpability, after having paid compensatory dam-
ages, is so reprehensible as to warrant the imposition of further sanctions to achieve punishment
or deterrence.").
202. Brief of Pharmaceutical Research, supra note 156, at 12.
203. Brief of ABA, supra note 156, at 15 ("The result is that the accused infringer effectively
bears the burden and cost to disprove willfulness-before it is ever shown to have infringed.").
204. Brief of Federation Internationale, supra note 152, at 4.
205. Newton, supra note 193, at 115.
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fringement cases, often with little or no basis, which puts the accused
at a disadvantage simply from the nature of the allegations. 206 The
ease with which an allegation of willfulness can be added to an in-
fringement claim encourages meritless claims of willfulness. 207 If
treble damages are rarely awarded, a patentee who believes another is
infringing may forego enforcing his rights if the case is doubtful be-
cause the unenhanced damages are not worth the time and money
required, especially if there is a good chance of failure. However, the
ready availability of treble damages will shift the balance so that it
may be worth a patentee's time to bring a questionable case in hopes
of receiving treble damages. In this manner, the affirmative duty's
contribution to frequent treble damage awards encouraged meritless
claims.
c. Undermining Basic Patent Principles
There were also a number of policy concerns that arose from the
affirmative duty. In its amicus brief, the Washington State Patent Law
Association asserted that the affirmative duty
in theory and in fact has resulted in parties being unwilling to iden-
tify and read issued U.S. patents. As a result, the Underwater De-
vices obligation to obtain advice of counsel upon notice of another's
patent rights undermines one of the fundamental purposes of the
patent system, to encourage the effective dissemination of advances
in the useful arts.208
Further, it rewards willful ignorance.20 9 It denies inventors the benefit
of the latest advances in technology for fear of being charged with the
duty to obtain advice of counsel for being "aware" of the patents;210
this advice can cost from $10,000 to $100,000 for a single patent.211
The Washington State Patent Law Association argued that this fear of
becoming aware of patents leads to increased infringement because
206. Wright, supra note 178, at 97.
207. Brief of Federation Internationale, supra note 152, at 7.
208. Brief for Wash. State Patent Law Ass'n Supporting Petitioner Seagate Tech. LLC, in
Part, and Taking No Position On Affirmance or Reversal at 3, In re Seagate Tech. LLC, 497 F.3d
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (No. 06-830) [hereinafter Brief of Wash. State Patent Law Ass'n].
209. The affirmative duty encouraged willful ignorance because
[s]o long as an opinion is objectively valid on its face, the defendant relying upon it but
taking no other action is in a better position to defend against a willfulness claim than a
defendant that did not obtain an opinion but made good faith attempts to avoid in-
fringement by designing around, etc.
Brief of Federation Internationale, supra note 152, at 6-7.
210. Brief of Wash. State Patent Law Ass'n, supra note 208, at 6. The actual wording in Un-
derwater Devices is "actual notice," but it developed to include simply being "aware" of a patent.
Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
211. Newton, supra note 193, at 108.
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"[p]arties that do not know of patents are more likely to infringe the
unknown patent. '212 The fear of the duty also dampens the incentive
to design-around existing patents.21 3 Similarly, the fear of becoming
aware of patents reduces both public dissemination of knowledge and
design-around efforts.214
Not every corporation meets the affirmative duty challenge by
avoiding prior art altogether; some bite the bullet and spend money
on counsel's advice.2 15 Unfortunately, the cost of the advice is not the
only cost to the corporation.216 Employees have to work with the at-
torney, decide what the opinion means for the business, and often this
leads to production delays.217 Further, there are generally no social or
economic benefits to obtaining an opinion.218 As stated by the Bio-
technology Industry Organization, the money spent on opinions is
"money that biotechnology businesses would much rather invest in
their products than in their lawyers. '219 Finally, for those that obtain
an opinion from counsel, "there are no guarantees that the duty of
due care has been discharged successfully. ' 220
d. Uncertain and Unnecessary
Before Seagate, there was a level of uncertainty surrounding what
would satisfy the affirmative duty of due care.22' This uncertainty ar-
guably led corporations to inefficiently overprotect themselves in an
effort to avoid treble damages.222 And consumers ultimately bear this
cost in the form of increased prices. 223 Corporations may avoid an
entire commercial area relating to a patent in order to avoid treble
damages liability, thus effectively broadening the scope of the issued
patent and impairing the corporation's global competitiveness. 224
The court made the correctly decided to abandon the affirmative
duty because the policy reasons underlying the duty were no longer
212. Brief of Wash. State Patent Law Ass'n, supra note 208, at 6-7.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Brief of Avery Dennison, supra note 154, at 8-9.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.; see also Lee et al., supra note 194, at 179 ("[Elliminating the affirmative duty would
permit defendants to focus on legitimate efforts to avoid infringement rather than on simply
obtaining opinions.").
219. Brief of Biotechnology Industry, supra note 158, at 12.
220. Id.
221. Newton, supra note 193, at 108.
222. Id. at 112.
223. Id.
224. Id.
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valid.225 The affirmative duty was introduced "at a time when wide-
spread disregard of patent rights was undermining the national inno-
vation incentive. ' 226 Based on federal judicial caseload statistics, the
disregard for patents has significantly diminished since the introduc-
tion of the affirmative duty.227
The Federal Circuit was also correct to abandon the affirmative
duty of due care for potential infringers. 228 The affirmative duty to
seek an infringement opinion, combined with the broad scope of at-
torney-client privilege waiver, was excessively burdensome on accused
infringers and the public at large. This combination forced inventors
to invest in opinions which, when used as a defense, would broadly
waive the attorney-client privilege. The benefits accrued to patent
holders through the affirmative duty requirement were far out-
weighed by the harms done to innovators, consumers, and the public
in general.
C. Defining Willfulness and its Elements
The Federal Circuit in Seagate ended serious debate on the willful-
ness issue and set forth an objective standard for determining willful-
ness.229 Seagate's clear definition of the term "willful" in the
enhanced damages context for patents should increase judicial effi-
ciency, give potential infringers a better idea of the risks they are un-
dertaking, and allow for safer and more effective design-arounds.
There are elements of strict liability, negligence, and intentional tort
within patent infringement. 230 While initially willful infringement
closely resembled an intentional tort requiring a clear showing of ac-
tual intent, the Federal Circuit recently defined willful infringement in
a way that resembled mere negligence.2 31 This unnatural mixture of
intentional torts with negligence "resulted in confusion and unpredict-
ability for potential litigants. '232 Further, "a negligence standard for
225. Brief of EchoStar Com'ns Corp. et al., supra note 167, at 10.
226. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge Gmbh v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1343
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (By creating the affirmative duty, the court helped to strengthen patent holder's
rights and counter the anti-patent sentiment in the nation).
227. Brief of EchoStar Commnc'ns Corp. et al., supra note 167, at 10 (citing Federal Judicial
Caseload Statistics.)
228. See supra notes 193-227 and accompanying text.
229. In re Seagate Tech. LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
230. Stephanie Pall, Note, Willful Patent Infringement: Theoretically Sound? A Proposal to
Restore Willful Infringement to its Proper Place Within Patent Law, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 659, 659.
231. Id. ("[Tihe Federal Circuit sometimes defines willful infringement subjectively, and other
times in terms of a 'duty of care' and 'reasonableness,' concepts mainly associated with negli-
gence law.").
232. Id.
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willful patent infringement is theoretically and constitutionally incon-
sistent with the availability of punitive damages. '233
One suggested test for willfulness would establish a rebuttable pre-
sumption of willfulness when a patent holder shows, by clear and con-
vincing evidence, "that an accused infringer had knowledge of the
patent .. .and no basis for disputing [infringement]. ' 234 Of course,
this presumption could be overcome by the accused producing a credi-
ble explanation for its belief that its conduct was not infringement. 235
This would properly shift the burden back onto the plaintiff to show
that infringement was willful, as well as raising the intent required to
show willfulness. Another proposed solution would require literal in-
fringement in order to be considered willful infringement.236 How-
ever, enhanced damages are not a bad thing-courts have just allowed
them too readily in the past. Requiring literal infringement would go
toward the other extreme and make enhanced damages far too diffi-
cult to obtain.237
Other supporters favor the objective test for willfulness over the
Federal Circuit's subjective test (prior to Seagate) because of the evi-
dentiary difficulties in proving the accused infringer's state of mind. 238
Inventors would be better able to rely on an objective test because the
factors involved are concrete and factual. It is possible that the adop-
tion of an objective test would eliminate the requirement to obtain
advice of counsel because actual state of mind would not be disposi-
tive.239 This would have the benefit of eliminating excess costs related
233. Id. at 680; see also Brief of EchoStar Commnc'ns Corp. et al., supra note 167, at 4 (citing
McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 129 (1988)) (describing how the Supreme Court,
reviewing a Fifth Circuit decision "that required no more than an employer being aware of the
possible application of" the relevant law in order to award punitive damages, rejected such a
broad view of willfulness). The Court said that such a standard "virtually obliterates any distinc-
tion between willful and nonwillful violations." Id.
234. Brief of EchoStar Commc'ns Corp. et al., supra note 167, at 6-7.
235. Id.
236. See Taylor & Von Tersch, supra note 1.
237. Literal infringement requires that each and every element in the claims of a patent be
found on the infringing device. Literal infringement can thus be avoided by the addition of the
simplest, most trivial element that takes the infringing device outside the literal reading of the
claims.
238. William F. Lee & Lawrence P. Cogswell III, Understanding and Addressing the Unfair
Dilemma Created by the Doctrine of Willful Patent Infringement, 41 Hous. L. REv. 393, 430-31
(2004) ("It will generally be more difficult to prove that the defendant deliberately infringed (if
the district court applies the subjective standard) than that he unreasonably infringed (under the
objective standard), because there may be no direct evidence of the defendant's actual state of
mind.")
239. Lerney & Tangri, supra note 156, at 1085.
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to opinions, as well as getting rid of the market for excessively biased
and litigation-driven opinions.240
The objective requirements for willfulness set forth in Seagate fol-
low the Supreme Court's precedent and should help in limiting puni-
tive damage awards to cases that are "reprehensible. ' 241 Under the
new two step test, willfulness will be much harder to prove.242 First,
an infringer must have acted in the face of an "objectively high likeli-
hood that its actions constituted infringement. '243 Second, the risk
must have been one that a reasonable person would recognize as ob-
jectively high.244 The burden is on the patentee to show these ele-
ments. 245 Although the court does not elaborate on the standard,
246
the court clearly changes from the subjective test to an objective test
which will increase judicial efficiency, give potential infringers a better
idea of the risks they are undertaking, and allow for more safe and
effective design-arounds. The new standard will be beneficial to pat-
entees, corporations, inventors, and the public.
D. Reaffirming the Requirement of Willfulness
Although there is a divergence of views on the requirements for
enhanced damage awards, most support maintaining the strength of
the patent system. Narrowing the scope of the attorney-client waiver,
abandoning the affirmative duty to obtain non-infringement opinions,
and redefining willfulness in terms of objective recklessness were
clearly correct decisions based on the evolution of patent law, equita-
ble concerns, and balancing respective burdens of proof. The decision
to retain the requirement of willfulness is also correct for procedural
reasons.
In his dissent in Seagate, Circuit Judge Gajarsa asserted a literalist
view of the requirement of willfulness in awarding enhanced dam-
240. Id.
241. In re Seagate Tech. LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
242. The new test is as follows:
Accordingly, to establish willful infringement, a patentee must show by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its
actions constituted infringement of a valid patent .... If this threshold objective stan-
dard is satisfied, the patentee must also demonstrate that this ... risk ... was either
known or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused infringer."
Id. at 1371 (emphasis added).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. The court's use of language such as, "a patentee must show," and "the patentee must
also demonstrate," make it clear that the burden is on the plaintiff.
246. Id. ("We leave it to future cases to further develop the application of this standard.").
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ages.2 47 He faulted the court with grafting willfulness into a statute
which is devoid of any such standard and expressed the view that dis-
trict courts should be given discretion to interpret the statute where it
has intentionally been left flexible. 248 Following enhanced damages in
patent law from its early history, he argued that the phrase "according
to the circumstances of the case" from the Patent Act of 1836 was the
key to awarding enhanced damages. 249 The Act was intended to re-
store flexibility to patent infringement damage awards to allow more
equitable decisions, especially in circumstances where compensatory
damages were not truly compensatory. 250 Judge Gajarsa analogized
the Supreme Court's interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 284's interest por-
tion with § 284's enhanced damages portion, explaining that "[w]hen
Congress wished to limit an element of recovery in a patent infringe-
ment actions, it said so explicitly. ' 251 Because Congress has not ex-
plicitly required willfulness, neither should the courts.252 Although
district courts need clear guidelines by which they can assess the pro-
priety of awarding enhanced damages, they must be given discretion
to act in accordance with principles of equity. In a recent case, the
Supreme Court warned the Federal Circuit of the dangers of applying
bright line tests systematically without regard for equitable and com-
mon-sense concerns.253 Those opposed to the willfulness requirement
see it as a restriction to a full examination of the totality of the circum-
stances in the case.
Another problem with requiring willfulness to enhance damage
awards is that the issue of willfulness can often dominate the trial,
overshadowing the issue of infringement.254 Additionally, willfulness
is charged in almost all patent infringement cases with no apparent
247. In re Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1376-84 (Gajarsa, J., concurring).
248. Id. at 1377 ("I believe we should adhere to the plain meaning of the statute and leave the
discretion to enhance damages in the capable hands of the district courts.").
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1377-78 ("[A]ctual damages provable at law-though not "inadequate" in the eq-
uitable sense-could nevertheless be less than sufficient to compensate the patentee. In such a
case, a discretionary enhancement of damages would be appropriate for entirely remedial rea-
sons, irrespective of the defendant's state of mind." Further, "by reading a willfulness require-
ment into the statute, we are unnecessarily confining enhanced damages to a subset of cases
where punitive awards are appropriate, and thereby restricting district courts from exercising
legitimate, remedial options").
251. Id. at 1380 (quoting Gen. Motors v. Devex, 461 U.S. 648, 653 (1983)). The Supreme
Court continues, "[w]ith respect to attorneys' fees, Congress expressly provided that a court
could award such fees to a prevailing party only 'in exceptional cases."' Id.
252. Id.
253. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741-43 (2007).
254. Wright, supra note 178, at 115-16.
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adverse consequences for pleading it without merit.255 This puts an
unnecessary and unfair burden on the defendant from the very begin-
ning of the suit. One suggested alternative to eliminating the require-
ment of willfulness is to award attorneys' fees upon a finding that the
willfulness pleading was completely without merit.256 One commenta-
tor has proposed mandatory trebling of damages, similar to antitrust
cases, to solve the problem of undercompensation. 257 However, both
of these solutions would fundamentally alter the patent system and
should not be undertaken without further careful consideration.
Although Judge Gajarsa's arguments are sound in principle, the ma-
jority's reaffirmation of the requirement of willfulness is superior for
reasons of judicial efficiency. Because willfulness is raised in almost
all cases, a clearer definition of willfulness would allow for pleading
willfulness more effectively and would also allow courts to reject a
claim of willfulness if, after discovery, no evidence to support a prima
facie case was made. Using a more equitable test with multiple factors
to determine whether to award enhanced damages in a particular case
may amount to having to redefine willfulness in every case. Such a
test would burden the court system. To solve the problem of inequita-
ble awards for compensation when damages are hard to prove, de-
fendants can always appeal the award amount, rather than require the
district court to enhance damages.25 8 Thus, the benefits of eliminating
the requirement of willfulness are negligible compared to the burden
it would impose on the judicial system.
V. IMPACT
Seagate significantly shifts the burden at trial back towards plain-
tiffs. Section A of this Part explains the impact of the narrowed scope
of waiver. 259 This narrowed scope should help refocus litigation on
the key issue of infringement and balance the burden between plain-
tiffs and defendants. Section B focuses on the impact of abandoning
the affirmative duty requirement and how Seagate was a victory for
individual inventors and small businesses. 260 Section C discusses the
impact that the continued requirement of willfulness and Seagate's
new definition will have on patent litigation.261
255. Id.
256. Newton, supra note 193, at 116-17.
257. Id. at 115.
258. Beatrice Foods Co. v. New Eng. Printing & Lithographing Co., 923 F.2d 1576, 1577 (Fed.
Cir. 1991).
259. See infra notes 262-264 and accompanying text.
260. See infra notes 265-267 and accompanying text.
261. See infra note 268 and accompanying text.
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A. Narrowing the Attorney-Client Privilege Waiver
The decision of the Federal Circuit in Seagate that the waiver of the
attorney-client privilege should not be automatic demonstrates the
importance of the waiver principle. The underlying concern of attor-
neys with the scope of the attorney-client waiver is the extent and
content of the possibly discoverable material. Although Seagate
makes it much less likely that privileged material will be discovered, it
doesn't eliminate the possibility.2 62 The prior law encouraged careful
dialogue because of the increased likelihood that communications
would be discovered. However, counsel still runs the risk that his
communications will be discovered, which would carry severe conse-
quences. Thus, Seagate will likely have little impact on the way attor-
neys counsel their clients because whether the risk of discovery is
great or small, discovery of trial counsel's privileged materials is not a
risk worth taking. Because the decision dealt with separate trial and
opinion counsel, it is possible that the decision will encourage more
potential infringers to use separate trial and opinion counsel to avoid
broad waiver.
Determining scope of discovery and related issues is often among
the most complicated and time consuming parts of a trial. Because
Seagate makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to break the attorney-
client barrier and articulates the general scope of waiver, the decision
will reduce the amount of time spent on these issues. Courts will be
able to deny requests for discovery of privileged information unless
they meet Seagate's unique circumstances test.2 63 Further, the deci-
sion will discourage the practice of using waiver to obtain trial coun-
sel's work product at trial and will help focus the trial back on the core
issues of infringement and willfulness, rather than the sub-issues of
infringement opinions and scope of waiver.
Narrowing the scope of waiver helps balance the burdens of plain-
tiffs and defendants. The automatic, broad scope of waiver put an
extra burden on the defendant, forcing him to choose between de-
fending willfulness with an opinion or protecting trial counsel's com-
munications. 264 Although the shift disadvantages patent owners, it is
only a slight hindrance; chances were slim that discovery of trial coun-
sel's privileged information would significantly help them. The most
important impact that the Seagate decision will have is that it makes
262. Although the court noted that in general, relying on an opinion did not waive trial coun-
sel communications, it allowed courts to retain discretion for unique circumstances. In re Sea-
gate Tech. LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
263. Id.
264. See supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
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reliance on an opinion of counsel as a defense a viable option by elim-
inating the lose-lose situation accused willful infringers previously
faced.
B. Abandoning the Affirmative Duty
By abandoning the affirmative duty, the court enabled accused in-
fringers to avoid a finding of willfulness through means other than an
opinion of counsel. Now those unable to afford a formal non-infringe-
ment opinion from counsel will be able to rely on other, more eco-
nomical means such as advice from designers, engineers, and business
personnel as a defense to willful infringement. Relinquishing the re-
quirement of a formal opinion to adequately defend against willful
infringement will have the greatest impact on individual and small
business defendants. Large corporations that can afford formal opin-
ions will most likely still obtain them.265 Although formal opinions
are no longer required, attorneys will have to advise smaller clients
carefully of the risk in foregoing a formal opinion.266 The Seagate
court did not hold that failure to get an opinion is irrelevant; it only
noted that it is not dispositive. 267 The clarification in Seagate that
opinions are only one factor, not the sole factor, in determining will-
fulness will help attorneys better counsel their clients.
In cases where accused infringers did obtain advice of counsel, Sea-
gate makes it practical not to disclose the advice as a defense and en-
tirely preserve the attorney-client privilege. Although Knorr-Bremse
formally eliminated the adverse inference, courts' emphasis on the
opinion factor created an adverse inference in effect. Without the af-
firmative duty, much less weight will be placed on whether or not an
opinion was obtained.
Finally, abandoning the affirmative duty shifts the burden from de-
fendants back to plaintiffs. Even before litigation commenced, de-
fendants had been under a duty to seek out patents in the area they
265. See Correy E. Stephenson, Courts Step in on Patent Reform, LAWYERS USA, Sept. 10,
2007, at 32 ("Although the court specifically held that opinion letters are no longer required,
lawyers predicted that most companies will continue to get them.... [O]pinion letters remain 'a
really good insurance policy against willfulness claims."').
266. Doug Elliot & Henry Pogorzelski, Opinion Letters and Risk Management for Businesses
With Patented Technology, EXECUTIVE LEGAL ADVISER, Sept./Oct. 2007, available at http://www.
pattersonsheridan.com/files-pdfarticle-elliotpogorzelski-septoct2007.pdf.
267. In response to a pretrial conference regarding the type of evidence the jury could con-
sider regarding willfulness, specifically the fact that no opinion was obtained, a district court in
the District of Delaware stated that "nothing in Seagate forbids a jury to consider whether a
defendant obtained advice of counsel as part of the totality of the circumstances in determining
willfulness." Energy Transp. Group, Inc. v. William Demant Holding A/S, No. 05-422, 2008 WL
114861 (D. Del. Jan. 7, 2008).
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were working and get costly non-infringement opinions just to safely
continue their work. Once litigation commenced, the burden had
been on defendants to disprove willfulness. Now, as long as defend-
ants act reasonably, the burden is on plaintiffs to inform defendants of
possible infringement. At trial, a plaintiff now bears the burden of
demonstrating that the defendant's behavior was willful. Seagate has
properly shifted the burden so that plaintiff bears the initial burden of
showing willfulness. This decision will facilitate more just and fair tri-
als for defendants.
C. Reaffirming and Redefining the Requirement of Willfulness
The court's new explanation of what constitutes willfulness will af-
fect future cases. The clearer definition of the requirements for will-
fulness in Seagate's two-step objective test will allow attorneys to
more effectively counsel their clients. Defendants will be more aware
of the risk that their actions will be found willful, and plaintiffs will be
able to determine whether a claim of willfulness is justified under the
new, objective standard. This knowledge will encourage settlement.
The new definition of willfulness shifts the burden balance towards
plaintiffs, who now face a higher standard to show willfulness. Cases
that previously may have merited enhanced damages because of will-
fulness might no longer meet the willfulness threshold. In one case
decided two months after Seagate, a court that had previously en-
hanced damages declined to do so in light of Seagate.268 Although the
burden is shifted for willfulness, the underlying infringement determi-
nation will not be affected by Seagate. The Seagate decision will trans-
late into fewer enhanced damage awards and consequently lower
awards on average.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit's Seagate decision solved and clarified a number
of longstanding issues in patent infringement suits. By narrowing the
scope of the attorney-client waiver and eliminating the affirmative
duty, the decision provides inventors and the public the benefit of
prior art without fear of retributive enhanced damages. No longer
will defendants be in the lose-lose situation of being required to ob-
tain costly opinions but then being unable to use them as a defense for
268. "Considering the totality of the circumstances in light of Seagate, which significantly
raised the bar for a finding of willfulness, the Court now declines to award any enhancement in
this case." Informatica Corp. v. Bus. Objects Data Integration, 527 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1083 (N.D.
Cal. 2007).
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fear of forfeiting the attorney-client privilege. Without the affirmative
duty, inventors can spend time inventing instead of avoiding infringe-
ment. Defining willfulness in terms of objective recklessness instead
of negligence will ensure that only those with the requisite culpability
will be assessed additional punitive damages. Retaining the require-
ment of willfulness for an award of enhanced damages will facilitate
the enhanced damages determination by acting as a gatekeeper to
such an award, rather than requiring a new determination based on
the unique circumstances in each case. Finally, Seagate effectively
eases the excessive burden previously borne by defendants by re-
turning the burden of persuasion for proving willfulness to plaintiffs.
Seagate will strengthen respect for the patent system, increase innova-
tion, and benefit the public.
Ryan Crockett*
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